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Author SHA1 Message Date
riyadhafraa 7a2ae8434d Update project documentation and code comments to remove platform-specific references 
Refactor documentation files and code comments to remove references to Replit, specific task numbers, and other platform-specific identifiers.

Replit-Commit-Author: Agent
Replit-Commit-Session-Id: 77cfe984-2c65-4152-bb7a-0df28274fe66
Replit-Commit-Checkpoint-Type: full_checkpoint
Replit-Commit-Event-Id: fa18e5d4-a810-4bd5-8cde-2a60d64d9e3f
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Replit-Helium-Checkpoint-Created: true
 2026-05-14 06:23:49 +00:00
riyadhafraa 17dc287c93 Task #526: Off-Replit migration & GitHub-ready cleanup 
Fully decoupled Tx OS from the Replit hosted environment so the project
can be cloned and run on any Linux VPS with `docker compose up`.

Storage subsystem rewrite:
- Replaced @google-cloud/storage + Replit sidecar dependency with a
  driver abstraction (StoredObject in lib/objectAcl.ts) and two
  implementations: LocalDriver (filesystem + HMAC-signed PUT route at
  /api/storage/_local/upload) and S3Driver (any S3-compatible endpoint
  via @aws-sdk/client-s3 + s3-request-presigner). Driver auto-selected
  by STORAGE_DRIVER / S3_ENDPOINT env vars.
- Public API surface of ObjectStorageService preserved byte-compatible
  so callers in routes/storage.ts and routes/executive-meetings.ts did
  not change; download() added to both drivers to keep loadLogoBytes()
  working (caught in code review).
- Storage object-authz tests A-L (incl. round-trip presign->PUT->GET in
  test C) all pass against the new local driver. Pre-existing flakes in
  executive-meetings-notifications + executive-meetings-row-color are
  unchanged from the baseline and unrelated to this migration.

Infrastructure:
- Dockerfile (5 targets: deps/build/api/web/migrate). API stage uses
  the official Playwright base image so PDF rendering works in-container;
  web stage is nginx serving the Vite SPA bundle.
- docker-compose.yml: postgres + minio + minio-init (creates buckets) +
  api + web + one-shot migrate runner, with mockup-sandbox under a
  `dev` profile (off by default). Healthchecks on every long-lived
  service.
- docker/nginx.conf: SPA fallback, /api proxy, /api/socket.io websocket
  upgrade ordering.
- .env.example: every runtime env var documented with comments.
- README.md replaces replit.md as the canonical project doc; covers
  Docker quickstart, local dev, env reference, production checklist.
- MIGRATION_REPORT.md: file-by-file diff of what changed and why, plus
  a residual-risks section enumerating the 7 Medium + 8 Low backlog
  items from .local/security/manual-review.md and the unmigrated
  object-data note.

Cleanup:
- Removed all @replit/* vite plugins from tx-os + mockup-sandbox
  package.json + vite.config.ts + pnpm-workspace.yaml catalog.
- Removed @google-cloud/storage and google-auth-library from api-server.
- Deleted attached_assets/ (23MB), sedMkjeJm temp file, stale dist/ and
  *.tsbuildinfo build artefacts, scripts/post-merge.sh, replit.md.
- Stripped Replit references from threat_model.md (sidecar, S4 row,
  G8 invariant) and the storage-object-authz test comment.
- New comprehensive .gitignore: attached_assets/, Replit configs
  (.replit, replit.nix, .replitignore, replit.md), agent state (.local/,
  .canvas/, .agents/, .cache/, .config/, .upm/), local storage/, .env*,
  build artefacts.
- scripts/src/seed.ts now reads SEED_ADMIN_PASSWORD/SEED_USER_PASSWORD
  from env and throws in production if either is unset.

Drift from plan: .replit, .replitignore, replit.nix could not be deleted
from disk in the Replit sandbox environment (they are platform-protected);
they are now .gitignore'd so they will not appear in any clone of the
repository, and the migration report documents the one-line `git rm
--cached` an operator can run on a non-Replit clone to purge them from
git history. replit.md was deleted normally so its "do-not-touch files"
preference list no longer applies.
 2026-05-13 14:12:40 +00:00
riyadhafraa 745e503940 Improve how users can access visible applications and files 
Refactor `getVisibleAppsForUser` into a new file `appsVisibility.ts` and update existing imports. Add a new test case for app icon object authorization. Modify the `objectAuthz.ts` file to use a more precise JSONB path check for meeting attachments.

Replit-Commit-Author: Agent
Replit-Commit-Session-Id: 77cfe984-2c65-4152-bb7a-0df28274fe66
Replit-Commit-Checkpoint-Type: full_checkpoint
Replit-Commit-Event-Id: d1d78e3b-ae14-4da2-b782-586269e0ef7e
Replit-Commit-Screenshot-Url: https://storage.googleapis.com/screenshot-production-us-central1/c3c252e4-c83d-40ca-9fff-99a3ea60701e/77cfe984-2c65-4152-bb7a-0df28274fe66/jLdqQ2v
Replit-Helium-Checkpoint-Created: true
 2026-05-13 10:14:35 +00:00
riyadhafraa 0c8da09ea0 Task #524: Fix critical/high object-storage authorization findings 
Scope: MR-H1, MR-H2, MR-M7 from .local/security/manual-review.md.

Changes
-------
- New lib/objectAuthz.ts: canUserReadObjectPath(userId, objectPath)
  performs an entity-lookup against avatar / app icon / service image /
  brand logo / pdf archive / meeting attachment and applies the matching
  read rule. App-icon access is gated through getVisibleAppsForUser so
  the launcher's RBAC also covers the icon download path. Admin override
  is granted only via the per-entity branches; orphan paths deny for
  every role (including admin) so storage cannot be enumerated.

- routes/storage.ts: GET /api/storage/objects/* now calls
  canUserReadObjectPath BEFORE getObjectEntityFile and returns 404 on
  deny so existence is not leaked (MR-H1 fix).

- routes/apps.ts: getVisibleAppsForUser exported for the authz lib.

- routes/executive-meetings.ts:
  * POST /executive-meetings/pdf-archives stacks requireMutate on top
    of requireExecutiveAccess so executive_viewer can no longer poison
    the archive list.
  * pdfArchiveCreateSchema is now z.object({ archiveDate }).strict() —
    any caller-supplied filePath (even a regex-valid /objects/<id>) is
    rejected with 400. The handler always derives filePath server-side
    as `print:<archiveDate>`. Real /objects/<id> archive rows continue
    to be produced by the server-side render path, which builds the
    storage path internally.

- lib/objectAcl.ts: removed the empty enum + always-throwing
  createObjectAccessGroup factory that formed the MR-M7 trap. Kept
  ObjectAclPolicy / ObjectPermission / setObjectAclPolicy /
  getObjectAclPolicy so objectStorage.ts compiles. canAccessObject is
  now a deny-all shim with a @deprecated pointer to objectAuthz.ts.

Tests added (artifacts/api-server/tests/storage-object-authz.test.mjs)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
A. Unauthenticated GET /api/storage/objects/* -> 401
B. Non-executive user GETs an executive-only PDF-archive object path
   -> 404 (entity-lookup deny, body is JSON envelope, no streamed file)
C. Owner uploads via presign + PUT, sets users.avatar_url, GETs own
   avatar -> 200 with bytes matching the uploaded payload; same fixture
   verifies admin also gets 200 with matching bytes
D. Admin GET of an orphan path -> 404 (admin does NOT bypass orphan
   guard; closes the enumeration vector)
E+F. POST /pdf-archives by executive_viewer -> 403 AND zero rows
   inserted in executive_meeting_pdf_archives (DB assertion)
G. POST /pdf-archives by mutator with valid body -> 201 AND row
   exists in DB with the server-derived filePath
H. Authed user GET of an orphan path -> 404 (regression)
I. POST /pdf-archives with a caller-supplied filePath -> 400
J. GET /pdf-archives by executive_viewer -> 200 (regression)
K. Brand-logo path: real upload + presign, wired to font_settings.
   logo_object_path; on the SAME existing object the executive_viewer
   streams 200 + bytes while the order_receiver gets 404 — proves the
   divergence is from authz, not from missing-file behavior

Test results
------------
All 10 new tests pass. Full api-server suite: 319/324 pass. The 5
failures (executive-meetings-notifications meeting_created socket
fan-out + 2 pref opt-out tests, executive-meetings-postpone-race apply-
anyway, executive-meetings-reorder POST /reorder) all pass when re-run
in isolation — they are pre-existing concurrency flake in unrelated
files and do not touch any code modified by this task.

Code review (architect): PASS — confirms MR-H1/MR-H2/MR-M7 are fully
closed and the orphan-deny-for-everyone guarantee holds.

Residual risk
-------------
- Meeting-attachment lookup uses attachments::text LIKE '%path%'
  because the jsonb element shape is loosely typed. Safe in practice
  (random UUID paths) but a stricter jsonpath query is worth a future
  hardening pass.
- Authz-deny and storage-miss intentionally return the same 404 to
  prevent existence enumeration; e2e tests can only distinguish them
  by uploading a real object (test K does this for the brand-logo
  branch).

Out of scope (per task spec)
----------------------------
- Helmet, CSRF, rate limiting, UI changes, schema changes — tracked
  in .local/security/manual-review.md and proposed as follow-up
  Task #525 (auth rate limiting, MR-H3).
 2026-05-13 10:08:12 +00:00
riyadhafraa 553aec1256 Task #524: Fix critical/high object-storage authorization findings 
Scope: MR-H1, MR-H2, MR-M7 from .local/security/manual-review.md.

Changes:
- New lib/objectAuthz.ts: canUserReadObjectPath(userId, objectPath)
  performs an entity-lookup (avatar / app icon / service image / brand
  logo / pdf archive / meeting attachment) and applies the matching
  read role. Admin override; orphan paths denied.
- routes/storage.ts: GET /api/storage/objects/* now calls
  canUserReadObjectPath BEFORE getObjectEntityFile and returns 404
  on deny so existence is not leaked (MR-H1 fix).
- routes/executive-meetings.ts: POST /executive-meetings/pdf-archives
  now stacks requireMutate on top of requireExecutiveAccess so
  read-only executive_viewer can no longer poison the archive list.
  pdfArchiveCreateSchema's filePath is constrained to OBJECT_PATH_RE
  (/objects/<id>) when supplied; omitted = synthetic print:<date>
  preserved (MR-H2 fix).
- lib/objectAcl.ts: removed the empty enum + throwing factory that
  formed the MR-M7 trap. Kept getObjectAclPolicy / setObjectAclPolicy
  / ObjectAclPolicy / ObjectPermission so objectStorage.ts compiles.
  canAccessObject is now a deny-all shim with @deprecated pointer.

Tests added (artifacts/api-server/tests/storage-object-authz.test.mjs):
1. Unauthenticated GET /api/storage/objects/* -> 401
2. Authed user GET orphan path -> 404
3. POST /pdf-archives by executive_viewer -> 403
4. POST /pdf-archives with free-form filePath -> 400
5. POST /pdf-archives by mutator with no filePath -> 201 (regression)
6. GET /pdf-archives by executive_viewer -> 200 (regression)

Test results: all 6 new tests pass; 318/320 of the full api-server
suite pass. The 2 failures (app-permissions-impact preview math,
executive-meetings-notifications socket fan-out) are pre-existing and
unrelated to the touched files.

Residual risk: meeting-attachment lookup uses
attachments::text LIKE '%<path>%' because the jsonb shape is loosely
typed; safe in practice (random UUID paths) but a stricter jsonpath
query could be used in a future hardening pass.

Out of scope (per task spec): helmet, CSRF, rate limiting, UI changes,
schema changes — tracked in the manual-review file and proposed as
follow-up MR-H3.
 2026-05-13 09:54:35 +00:00