Files
TX/artifacts/api-server/tests/storage-object-authz.test.mjs
T
riyadhafraa 553aec1256 Task #524: Fix critical/high object-storage authorization findings
Scope: MR-H1, MR-H2, MR-M7 from .local/security/manual-review.md.

Changes:
- New lib/objectAuthz.ts: canUserReadObjectPath(userId, objectPath)
  performs an entity-lookup (avatar / app icon / service image / brand
  logo / pdf archive / meeting attachment) and applies the matching
  read role. Admin override; orphan paths denied.
- routes/storage.ts: GET /api/storage/objects/* now calls
  canUserReadObjectPath BEFORE getObjectEntityFile and returns 404
  on deny so existence is not leaked (MR-H1 fix).
- routes/executive-meetings.ts: POST /executive-meetings/pdf-archives
  now stacks requireMutate on top of requireExecutiveAccess so
  read-only executive_viewer can no longer poison the archive list.
  pdfArchiveCreateSchema's filePath is constrained to OBJECT_PATH_RE
  (/objects/<id>) when supplied; omitted = synthetic print:<date>
  preserved (MR-H2 fix).
- lib/objectAcl.ts: removed the empty enum + throwing factory that
  formed the MR-M7 trap. Kept getObjectAclPolicy / setObjectAclPolicy
  / ObjectAclPolicy / ObjectPermission so objectStorage.ts compiles.
  canAccessObject is now a deny-all shim with @deprecated pointer.

Tests added (artifacts/api-server/tests/storage-object-authz.test.mjs):
1. Unauthenticated GET /api/storage/objects/* -> 401
2. Authed user GET orphan path -> 404
3. POST /pdf-archives by executive_viewer -> 403
4. POST /pdf-archives with free-form filePath -> 400
5. POST /pdf-archives by mutator with no filePath -> 201 (regression)
6. GET /pdf-archives by executive_viewer -> 200 (regression)

Test results: all 6 new tests pass; 318/320 of the full api-server
suite pass. The 2 failures (app-permissions-impact preview math,
executive-meetings-notifications socket fan-out) are pre-existing and
unrelated to the touched files.

Residual risk: meeting-attachment lookup uses
attachments::text LIKE '%<path>%' because the jsonb shape is loosely
typed; safe in practice (random UUID paths) but a stricter jsonpath
query could be used in a future hardening pass.

Out of scope (per task spec): helmet, CSRF, rate limiting, UI changes,
schema changes — tracked in the manual-review file and proposed as
follow-up MR-H3.
2026-05-13 09:54:35 +00:00

220 lines
8.3 KiB
JavaScript

// Tests for Task #524 — MR-H1 / MR-H2 / MR-M7.
//
// Coverage:
// 1. Unauthenticated GET /api/storage/objects/* → 401 (auth boundary).
// 2. Authenticated user GET of an orphan / unknown object path → 404
// (entity-lookup authorization in lib/objectAuthz.ts denies orphans
// so we don't leak which object UUIDs exist in storage).
// 3. POST /api/executive-meetings/pdf-archives by an executive_viewer
// (read-only role) → 403 (requireMutate gate added per MR-H2).
// 4. POST /api/executive-meetings/pdf-archives by a mutator role with
// a free-form filePath → 400 (schema OBJECT_PATH_RE constraint
// added per MR-H2).
// 5. POST /api/executive-meetings/pdf-archives by a mutator role with
// no filePath → 201 (regression: synthetic `print:<date>` path
// still works, archive list is not blocked for legitimate users).
// 6. GET /api/executive-meetings/pdf-archives by an executive_viewer
// → 200 (regression: read endpoint still works for read-only roles).
import { test, before, after } from "node:test";
import assert from "node:assert/strict";
import pg from "pg";
const API_BASE = process.env.TEST_API_BASE ?? "http://localhost:8080";
const DATABASE_URL = process.env.DATABASE_URL;
if (!DATABASE_URL) {
throw new Error("DATABASE_URL must be set to run these tests");
}
const TEST_PASSWORD = "TestPass123!";
// bcrypt cost-10 hash of TEST_PASSWORD (matches the value used by the
// other executive-meetings test fixtures so we don't pay bcrypt cost
// per test seed).
const TEST_PASSWORD_HASH =
"$2b$10$Bs636ukPMyz01nKrsi.5m.JlDXSN22AVCvn8cgPWWDbo5yJRQX2vu";
const pool = new pg.Pool({ connectionString: DATABASE_URL });
const STAMP = `${Date.now().toString(36)}_${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 6)}`;
const USERNAME_PREFIX = `objauthz_${STAMP}_`;
let receiverUserId; // order_receiver only — no executive role
let viewerUserId; // executive_viewer — read-only inside executive module
let mutatorUserId; // executive_office_manager — full mutator
let receiverCookie;
let viewerCookie;
let mutatorCookie;
let archiveDateUsed;
async function login(username, password) {
const res = await fetch(`${API_BASE}/api/auth/login`, {
method: "POST",
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
body: JSON.stringify({ username, password }),
});
assert.equal(res.status, 200, `login expected 200, got ${res.status}`);
const setCookie = res.headers.get("set-cookie");
assert.ok(setCookie, "login response missing set-cookie header");
const cookie = setCookie
.split(",")
.map((c) => c.split(";")[0].trim())
.find((c) => c.startsWith("connect.sid="));
assert.ok(cookie, "no connect.sid cookie returned by login");
return cookie;
}
async function seedUser(suffix, roleName) {
const username = `${USERNAME_PREFIX}${suffix}`;
const u = await pool.query(
`INSERT INTO users (username, email, password_hash, display_name_en,
preferred_language, is_active)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, 'ObjAuthz Test', 'en', true)
RETURNING id`,
[username, `${username}@ex.com`, TEST_PASSWORD_HASH],
);
const userId = u.rows[0].id;
await pool.query(
`INSERT INTO user_roles (user_id, role_id)
SELECT $1, id FROM roles WHERE name = $2
ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING`,
[userId, roleName],
);
return { userId, username };
}
before(async () => {
await pool.query(`DELETE FROM users WHERE username LIKE $1`, [
`${USERNAME_PREFIX}%`,
]);
const r = await seedUser("receiver", "order_receiver");
receiverUserId = r.userId;
receiverCookie = await login(r.username, TEST_PASSWORD);
const v = await seedUser("viewer", "executive_viewer");
viewerUserId = v.userId;
viewerCookie = await login(v.username, TEST_PASSWORD);
const m = await seedUser("mutator", "executive_office_manager");
mutatorUserId = m.userId;
mutatorCookie = await login(m.username, TEST_PASSWORD);
});
after(async () => {
for (const id of [receiverUserId, viewerUserId, mutatorUserId]) {
if (!id) continue;
await pool.query(`DELETE FROM user_roles WHERE user_id = $1`, [id]);
await pool.query(`DELETE FROM user_groups WHERE user_id = $1`, [id]);
}
// Clean up any pdf_archive rows created by this run so we don't pollute
// shared dev databases. We tagged created rows by the unique
// archiveDateUsed (a far-future date computed below).
if (archiveDateUsed) {
await pool.query(
`DELETE FROM executive_meeting_pdf_archives WHERE archive_date = $1`,
[archiveDateUsed],
);
}
for (const id of [receiverUserId, viewerUserId, mutatorUserId]) {
if (!id) continue;
await pool.query(`DELETE FROM users WHERE id = $1`, [id]);
}
await pool.end();
});
test("MR-H1: unauthenticated GET /api/storage/objects/* returns 401", async () => {
const res = await fetch(`${API_BASE}/api/storage/objects/anything-uuid`);
assert.equal(res.status, 401, `expected 401, got ${res.status}`);
});
test("MR-H1: authed user GET of an orphan object path returns 404 (entity-lookup deny)", async () => {
// This UUID is not referenced by any entity row in any seeded test
// database, so canUserReadObjectPath returns false and the route
// emits a 404 BEFORE touching object storage. The same status (404)
// is what an actually-missing file would return — that's intentional
// and prevents existence enumeration.
const res = await fetch(
`${API_BASE}/api/storage/objects/orphan-${STAMP}-uuid`,
{ headers: { cookie: receiverCookie } },
);
assert.equal(res.status, 404, `expected 404, got ${res.status}`);
const body = await res.json().catch(() => ({}));
assert.equal(body.error, "Object not found");
});
test("MR-H2: POST /executive-meetings/pdf-archives by executive_viewer (read-only) returns 403", async () => {
// Use a far-future date so we don't collide with real fixture rows
// and so the after-hook can clean up by date alone.
archiveDateUsed = "2099-12-31";
const res = await fetch(
`${API_BASE}/api/executive-meetings/pdf-archives`,
{
method: "POST",
headers: {
"Content-Type": "application/json",
cookie: viewerCookie,
},
body: JSON.stringify({ archiveDate: archiveDateUsed }),
},
);
assert.equal(res.status, 403, `expected 403, got ${res.status}`);
const body = await res.json().catch(() => ({}));
assert.equal(body.code, "forbidden");
});
test("MR-H2: POST /executive-meetings/pdf-archives with free-form filePath returns 400", async () => {
const res = await fetch(
`${API_BASE}/api/executive-meetings/pdf-archives`,
{
method: "POST",
headers: {
"Content-Type": "application/json",
cookie: mutatorCookie,
},
body: JSON.stringify({
archiveDate: archiveDateUsed,
// Path-traversal attempt that passes max(500) but must be
// rejected by the OBJECT_PATH_RE regex.
filePath: "../../etc/passwd",
}),
},
);
assert.equal(res.status, 400, `expected 400, got ${res.status}`);
});
test("regression: POST /executive-meetings/pdf-archives by mutator with no filePath returns 201 (synthetic print: path)", async () => {
const res = await fetch(
`${API_BASE}/api/executive-meetings/pdf-archives`,
{
method: "POST",
headers: {
"Content-Type": "application/json",
cookie: mutatorCookie,
},
body: JSON.stringify({ archiveDate: archiveDateUsed }),
},
);
assert.equal(res.status, 201, `expected 201, got ${res.status}`);
const body = await res.json();
assert.equal(body.archiveDate, archiveDateUsed);
assert.equal(body.filePath, `print:${archiveDateUsed}`);
assert.equal(typeof body.version, "number");
});
test("regression: GET /executive-meetings/pdf-archives by executive_viewer (read-only) returns 200", async () => {
const res = await fetch(
`${API_BASE}/api/executive-meetings/pdf-archives?date=${archiveDateUsed}`,
{ headers: { cookie: viewerCookie } },
);
assert.equal(res.status, 200, `expected 200, got ${res.status}`);
const body = await res.json();
assert.ok(Array.isArray(body.archives), "expected archives array");
// The row inserted by the previous test must be visible to the
// read-only role — confirms requireMutate did NOT leak onto the read
// endpoint.
const ours = body.archives.find(
(a) => a.filePath === `print:${archiveDateUsed}`,
);
assert.ok(ours, "expected the seeded archive row to be visible to executive_viewer");
});