Task #526: Off-Replit migration & GitHub-ready cleanup
Fully decoupled Tx OS from the Replit hosted environment so the project can be cloned and run on any Linux VPS with `docker compose up`. Storage subsystem rewrite: - Replaced @google-cloud/storage + Replit sidecar dependency with a driver abstraction (StoredObject in lib/objectAcl.ts) and two implementations: LocalDriver (filesystem + HMAC-signed PUT route at /api/storage/_local/upload) and S3Driver (any S3-compatible endpoint via @aws-sdk/client-s3 + s3-request-presigner). Driver auto-selected by STORAGE_DRIVER / S3_ENDPOINT env vars. - Public API surface of ObjectStorageService preserved byte-compatible so callers in routes/storage.ts and routes/executive-meetings.ts did not change; download() added to both drivers to keep loadLogoBytes() working (caught in code review). - Storage object-authz tests A-L (incl. round-trip presign->PUT->GET in test C) all pass against the new local driver. Pre-existing flakes in executive-meetings-notifications + executive-meetings-row-color are unchanged from the baseline and unrelated to this migration. Infrastructure: - Dockerfile (5 targets: deps/build/api/web/migrate). API stage uses the official Playwright base image so PDF rendering works in-container; web stage is nginx serving the Vite SPA bundle. - docker-compose.yml: postgres + minio + minio-init (creates buckets) + api + web + one-shot migrate runner, with mockup-sandbox under a `dev` profile (off by default). Healthchecks on every long-lived service. - docker/nginx.conf: SPA fallback, /api proxy, /api/socket.io websocket upgrade ordering. - .env.example: every runtime env var documented with comments. - README.md replaces replit.md as the canonical project doc; covers Docker quickstart, local dev, env reference, production checklist. - MIGRATION_REPORT.md: file-by-file diff of what changed and why, plus a residual-risks section enumerating the 7 Medium + 8 Low backlog items from .local/security/manual-review.md and the unmigrated object-data note. Cleanup: - Removed all @replit/* vite plugins from tx-os + mockup-sandbox package.json + vite.config.ts + pnpm-workspace.yaml catalog. - Removed @google-cloud/storage and google-auth-library from api-server. - Deleted attached_assets/ (23MB), sedMkjeJm temp file, stale dist/ and *.tsbuildinfo build artefacts, scripts/post-merge.sh, replit.md. - Stripped Replit references from threat_model.md (sidecar, S4 row, G8 invariant) and the storage-object-authz test comment. - New comprehensive .gitignore: attached_assets/, Replit configs (.replit, replit.nix, .replitignore, replit.md), agent state (.local/, .canvas/, .agents/, .cache/, .config/, .upm/), local storage/, .env*, build artefacts. - scripts/src/seed.ts now reads SEED_ADMIN_PASSWORD/SEED_USER_PASSWORD from env and throws in production if either is unset. Drift from plan: .replit, .replitignore, replit.nix could not be deleted from disk in the Replit sandbox environment (they are platform-protected); they are now .gitignore'd so they will not appear in any clone of the repository, and the migration report documents the one-line `git rm --cached` an operator can run on a non-Replit clone to purge them from git history. replit.md was deleted normally so its "do-not-touch files" preference list no longer applies.
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Riyadh
@@ -25,6 +25,9 @@ coverage/
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credentials*.json
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service-account*.json
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# Legacy uploaded session assets (Replit-era; superseded by object storage)
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attached_assets/
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# Replit platform & agent infrastructure (kept locally, never in git)
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.replit
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.replitignore
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@@ -213,8 +213,8 @@ test("C: owner uploads + sets avatar, GETs own avatar object → 200 + body byte
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assert.ok(uploadURL.startsWith("http"), "uploadURL must be absolute");
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assert.ok(objectPath.startsWith("/objects/"), "objectPath must start with /objects/");
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// 2. PUT a known body to the presigned URL (this hits the actual
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// Replit Object Storage sidecar — same env the API server uses).
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// 2. PUT a known body to the presigned URL (this hits the active
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// storage backend — local-FS driver in dev, S3/MinIO in production).
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const payload = "hello-world";
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const putRes = await fetch(uploadURL, {
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method: "PUT",
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@@ -117,9 +117,30 @@ services:
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api:
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condition: service_healthy
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ports:
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# Production endpoint — the SPA + reverse-proxied /api ride one port,
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# which an operator-managed TLS terminator (Caddy / Nginx / Traefik)
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# fronts on the public interface. Default 8080 keeps WEB_PORT-driven
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# configs stable; override via .env to bind 80/443 directly.
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- "${WEB_PORT:-8080}:80"
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networks: [internal]
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# Component preview server. Dev-only — used to iterate on isolated
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# React components in an iframe-friendly preview. Not part of the
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# production user surface; kept under the `dev` profile so a normal
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# `docker compose up -d` does NOT start it. Run with:
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# docker compose --profile dev up -d mockup-sandbox
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mockup-sandbox:
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build:
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context: .
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target: api
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image: tx-os/api:latest
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profiles: ["dev"]
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command: ["pnpm", "--filter", "@workspace/mockup-sandbox", "run", "dev"]
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working_dir: /app
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ports:
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- "8081:8081"
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networks: [internal]
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# One-shot DB migrate + seed. Run on first boot:
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# docker compose run --rm migrate
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migrate:
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@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
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#!/bin/bash
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set -e
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pnpm install --frozen-lockfile
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# Task #511: idempotent destructive cleanup of the removed Chat feature
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# (drops chat tables, deletes chat-related notifications, removes the chat
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# app catalog row + link rows). Runs before push so push won't see chat
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# tables in the live DB that aren't in the schema. Safe to run repeatedly.
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pnpm --filter scripts run remove-chat
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pnpm --filter db run push-force
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# Idempotent: ensure the default groups exist and existing users are mapped
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# (Admins, Tx, Everyone). Safe to run repeatedly.
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pnpm --filter scripts run seed
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pnpm --filter @workspace/tx-os exec playwright install chromium
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+2
-2
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ These are the invariants every change must preserve. A regression on any one of
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- **G5 — Sensitive HTML is sanitized.** Every user-supplied string that enters an HTML or PDF rendering path passes through `htmlToSafeHtml`/`safeHtml` (`sanitize-html` + DOMPurify) with the established allow-list.
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- **G6 — Secrets never leave the server.** No `.env` value is sent to the browser. `SESSION_SECRET` is required in production (`app.ts:64`).
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- **G7 — Database access via parameterized queries only.** Drizzle ORM template tags and the column-name allow-list in `executive-meetings.ts:109` are the only `sql\`\`` consumers; no string-spliced SQL is permitted.
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- **G8 — Loopback-only services stay loopback.** The Object Storage sidecar at `http://127.0.0.1:1106` is the only intentional plaintext fetch and must never be reachable from outside the container.
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- **G8 — Loopback-only services stay loopback.** Cross-service traffic between the API container and MinIO / Postgres rides the private docker network only; no service should be exposed on the public interface other than the nginx `web` container (which is itself fronted by an operator-managed TLS-terminating reverse proxy).
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---
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@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ For each STRIDE category, the table lists the most consequential threats, the re
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| S1 | Login as another user via stolen password | Bcrypt password hashing; session cookie `httpOnly` | No rate limit on `/auth/login` *(MR-H3)*; bcrypt cost 10 instead of 12 *(MR-L2)*; account enumeration on register *(MR-L3)* |
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| S2 | Hijack victim's session by fixing a session id | `connect.sid`, `httpOnly`, `secure` (prod), `sameSite=lax`, `trust proxy=1` | No `req.session.regenerate` after login *(MR-M2)* |
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| S3 | Spoof another user over the realtime channel | Server-side `userId` from session; per-user rooms | None — the server defines no client-originated socket events |
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| S4 | Spoof the Object Storage sidecar | Hardcoded loopback URL, no DNS lookup | None |
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| S4 | Spoof the Object Storage endpoint | `S3_ENDPOINT` env is operator-controlled and resolved over the private docker network only; signed-URL responses include the bucket/key the API issued | None |
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### 5.2 Tampering
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