Original task: attendee.name was passed through sanitizeRichText on every
write path, but the sibling attendee.title was treated as plain text and
inserted verbatim. The print page and any future HTML template that
interpolates a.title would have to remember to escape it. Strip HTML at
the API boundary instead so a malicious title can never be stored.
Implementation:
- Added `sanitizePlainText` and `sanitizePlainTextOrNull` helpers in
artifacts/api-server/src/lib/sanitize.ts. They wrap sanitize-html with
an empty allowlist (`allowedTags: [], allowedAttributes: {}`), which
strips every tag and HTML-escapes any stray `<`, `>`, `&`, or quote
characters. The OrNull variant preserves null for nullable columns.
- Applied `sanitizePlainTextOrNull(a.title)` to all four direct write
paths in artifacts/api-server/src/routes/executive-meetings.ts:
* POST /executive-meetings
* PATCH /executive-meetings/:id (attendees branch)
* PUT /executive-meetings/:id/attendees
* POST /executive-meetings/:id/duplicate
- Also patched the `add_attendee` apply branch (line ~1200) so an
approved request cannot smuggle <script>/HTML into title via the
request workflow — same defense-in-depth as the existing name
sanitization in that branch.
Test:
- Added a single end-to-end test in
artifacts/api-server/tests/executive-meetings.test.mjs that pushes a
malicious title (<script>, <b onclick=...>, <img onerror=...>,
<a href="javascript:...>) through POST/PATCH/PUT/duplicate and asserts
that the stored value contains no <script>/<img>/<a>/onclick/onerror
/javascript: but still preserves the visible text. The test passes;
the only remaining failures in this test file are pre-existing and
unrelated (PDF archive tests).
Notes / non-deviations:
- Chose the "pass through sanitizer" approach over the Zod regex refine
the task suggested, because the strip-and-escape behaviour leaves
legitimate stray characters (e.g. "Director < Manager") usable
instead of returning a 400.
- Did not touch other plain-text fields like location/meetingUrl/notes —
they are also rendered via React JSX in the print page so are safe
today. Captured as follow-up #189 for symmetric defense-in-depth.
Replit-Task-Id: 837863ea-23a1-4d26-8261-f0b7ef6e5b0f
riyadhafraa
628da1e448