Files
TX/artifacts/api-server/tests/auth-rate-limit.test.mjs
T
riyadhafraa 90dc95dc5c Task #525: Auth endpoint rate limiting (MR-H3)
Closes the remaining High-severity finding from
.local/security/manual-review.md: /api/auth/login,
/api/auth/register, /api/auth/forgot-password,
/api/auth/reset-password and /api/auth/reset-password/verify
accepted unlimited attempts, making remote brute-forcing of
weak passwords feasible against the bcrypt cost-10 store.

Changes
-------
- New artifacts/api-server/src/lib/authRateLimit.ts wraps
  express-rate-limit into route-level middleware:
  * loginIpLimiter         — 10 attempts / 60s per IP
  * loginUsernameLimiter   — 8 attempts / 15min per
                             trim().toLowerCase() username
  * registerIpLimiter      — 5 / hour per IP
  * forgotPasswordIpLimiter— 5 / 15min per IP
  * resetPasswordIpLimiter — 10 / 15min per IP, shared across
                             /reset-password and /reset-password/verify
  * loginLimiters chains IP + username middleware
  All thresholds and windows are env-overridable
  (AUTH_RATE_LIMIT_*_MAX / *_WINDOW_MS).
  Throttled responses are JSON: 429
  { error: "too_many_requests", message: ... }.
  In non-production, requests originating from loopback
  (127.0.0.1, ::1, ::ffff:127.*) skip the limiter so the
  existing test suite — which hammers /auth/login from
  loopback — keeps passing. Production never skips. The
  AUTH_RATE_LIMIT_FORCE=1 escape hatch flips the skip off
  in dev for ad-hoc verification.

- routes/auth.ts: applies the limiters to /auth/register,
  /auth/login, /auth/forgot-password, /auth/reset-password,
  /auth/reset-password/verify. trust proxy was already set
  to 1 in app.ts so X-Forwarded-For from the Replit edge
  drives req.ip in production.

- New artifacts/api-server/tests/auth-rate-limit.test.mjs
  (6 tests). Each test routes through a unique
  X-Forwarded-For 10.x.x.x to bypass the dev loopback skip
  while keeping limiter buckets isolated from one another:
    1. login per-IP: 10 wrong-cred attempts succeed (401),
       11th from the same IP returns 429
    2. login per-username: 8 wrong attempts spread across
       8 fresh IPs all 401, the 9th attempt for the same
       username from yet another fresh IP is 429 — proves
       the username bucket blocks credential stuffing
       even from rotating IPs
    3. forgot-password per-IP: 5 succeed, 6th 429
    4. register per-IP: 5 attempts processed, 6th 429
    5. reset-password (+verify) shared per-IP: 10 mixed
       hits across the two endpoints all processed, 11th 429
    6. loopback regression: 15 login attempts from
       loopback (no X-Forwarded-For) all return non-429,
       proving the dev skip works and existing tests are
       unaffected

Test results
------------
- New file: 6/6 pass.
- Full api-server suite: 327/329 pass. The 2 failures
  (executive-meetings-notifications meeting_created
  socket fan-out, executive-meetings-postpone-race
  postpone-minutes B refetches) are pre-existing
  concurrency flakes — both fail on main before this
  change, both pass when run in isolation, and neither
  touches code modified here.

Architect review
----------------
First round flagged missing register + reset-password
test coverage. Both added in this commit. trust-proxy
hardening flagged as advisory; left as-is because the
existing app.ts already sets trust proxy = 1 to match
the single Replit edge hop, and changing it is out of
this task's scope (separate hardening pass).

Residual risk
-------------
- Per-IP buckets rely on app.set("trust proxy", 1) in
  app.ts. If the deployment topology ever changes to put
  more than one trusted hop in front of the API, the
  trust-proxy value must be raised to match — otherwise
  attackers could spoof X-Forwarded-For to evade per-IP
  limits.
- The username-bucket key is normalized
  (trim().toLowerCase()) but does not collapse Unicode
  homoglyphs. Acceptable for this app: usernames are
  ASCII per RegisterBody validation.

Out of scope
------------
- Helmet, CSRF, session rotation, account-enumeration
  on register, bcrypt cost bump, body-size limits — all
  remain tracked in .local/security/manual-review.md as
  Medium/Low items.
2026-05-13 11:47:52 +00:00

217 lines
8.1 KiB
JavaScript

import { test, after } from "node:test";
import assert from "node:assert/strict";
import pg from "pg";
const API_BASE = process.env.TEST_API_BASE ?? "http://localhost:8080";
const DATABASE_URL = process.env.DATABASE_URL;
if (!DATABASE_URL) throw new Error("DATABASE_URL must be set to run these tests");
const pool = new pg.Pool({ connectionString: DATABASE_URL });
const TEST_PASSWORD = "TestPass123!";
// bcrypt cost 10 hash for TEST_PASSWORD (matches other test files in this repo)
const TEST_PASSWORD_HASH =
"$2b$10$Bs636ukPMyz01nKrsi.5m.JlDXSN22AVCvn8cgPWWDbo5yJRQX2vu";
const STAMP = `${Date.now().toString(36)}_${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`;
const createdUserIds = [];
const createdUsernames = [];
function uniqueIp(suffix) {
// Pick a non-loopback IPv4 so the rate-limit middleware applies
// (it skips loopback addresses in non-production).
const a = (Math.floor(Math.random() * 200) + 11) % 240; // 11..250
const b = Math.floor(Math.random() * 250) + 1;
const c = Math.floor(Math.random() * 250) + 1;
return `10.${a}.${b}.${c}#${suffix}`.split("#")[0];
}
async function createUser(username, isActive = true) {
const { rows } = await pool.query(
`INSERT INTO users (username, email, password_hash, display_name_en, preferred_language, is_active)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, 'Rate Test', 'en', $4) RETURNING id`,
[username, `${username}@example.com`, TEST_PASSWORD_HASH, isActive],
);
const id = rows[0].id;
createdUserIds.push(id);
createdUsernames.push(username);
await pool.query(
`INSERT INTO user_roles (user_id, role_id)
SELECT $1, id FROM roles WHERE name = 'user'`,
[id],
);
return id;
}
after(async () => {
if (createdUserIds.length > 0) {
await pool.query(`DELETE FROM password_reset_tokens WHERE user_id = ANY($1::int[])`, [createdUserIds]);
await pool.query(`DELETE FROM user_roles WHERE user_id = ANY($1::int[])`, [createdUserIds]);
await pool.query(`DELETE FROM users WHERE id = ANY($1::int[])`, [createdUserIds]);
}
if (createdUsernames.length > 0) {
await pool.query(`DELETE FROM users WHERE username = ANY($1::text[])`, [createdUsernames]);
}
await pool.end();
});
async function postLogin({ username, password, ip }) {
return fetch(`${API_BASE}/api/auth/login`, {
method: "POST",
headers: {
"Content-Type": "application/json",
"X-Forwarded-For": ip,
},
body: JSON.stringify({ username, password }),
});
}
async function postForgot({ identifier, ip }) {
return fetch(`${API_BASE}/api/auth/forgot-password`, {
method: "POST",
headers: {
"Content-Type": "application/json",
"X-Forwarded-For": ip,
},
body: JSON.stringify({ identifier }),
});
}
test("login: 11th attempt within window from same IP is throttled with 429", async () => {
const username = `rl_login_${STAMP}`;
await createUser(username);
const ip = uniqueIp("login-ip");
// First 10 with WRONG password from same IP, but with DIFFERENT usernames so
// we exercise only the per-IP limiter (default 10/min) and not the
// per-username limiter (default 8/15min).
for (let i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
const r = await postLogin({
username: `rl_login_dummy_${STAMP}_${i}`,
password: "wrong",
ip,
});
assert.equal(r.status, 401, `attempt ${i + 1} should be 401, got ${r.status}`);
}
// 11th attempt from the same IP must be throttled regardless of payload
const blocked = await postLogin({ username, password: TEST_PASSWORD, ip });
assert.equal(blocked.status, 429);
const body = await blocked.json();
assert.equal(body.error, "too_many_requests");
});
test("login: per-username limit blocks credential-stuffing across many IPs", async () => {
const username = `rl_user_${STAMP}`;
await createUser(username);
// 8 wrong-password attempts each from a fresh IP — each one trips the
// per-username limiter (default max 8) without ever exceeding any single
// IP's per-IP budget.
for (let i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
const r = await postLogin({
username,
password: "wrong",
ip: uniqueIp(`username-${i}`),
});
assert.equal(r.status, 401, `attempt ${i + 1} should be 401, got ${r.status}`);
}
// 9th attempt from yet another fresh IP must be 429 because the
// username-keyed limiter is exhausted.
const blocked = await postLogin({
username,
password: TEST_PASSWORD,
ip: uniqueIp("username-final"),
});
assert.equal(blocked.status, 429);
});
test("forgot-password: per-IP limit returns 429 after the budget", async () => {
const ip = uniqueIp("forgot");
// Default forgot-password budget is 5 per 15 min per IP
for (let i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
const r = await postForgot({ identifier: `nobody_${STAMP}_${i}`, ip });
assert.equal(r.status, 200, `attempt ${i + 1} should be 200, got ${r.status}`);
}
const blocked = await postForgot({ identifier: `nobody_${STAMP}_final`, ip });
assert.equal(blocked.status, 429);
});
test("register: per-IP limit returns 429 after the budget", async () => {
const ip = uniqueIp("register");
// Default register budget is 5 per hour per IP.
for (let i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
const username = `rl_reg_${STAMP}_${i}`;
createdUsernames.push(username);
const r = await fetch(`${API_BASE}/api/auth/register`, {
method: "POST",
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json", "X-Forwarded-For": ip },
body: JSON.stringify({
username,
email: `${username}@example.com`,
password: TEST_PASSWORD,
displayNameEn: "Rate Reg",
}),
});
// Either 201 (created) or 403 (registration closed) is fine — we only
// care that the route ran and consumed a slot, not 429.
assert.notEqual(r.status, 429, `attempt ${i + 1} unexpectedly throttled`);
}
const blocked = await fetch(`${API_BASE}/api/auth/register`, {
method: "POST",
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json", "X-Forwarded-For": ip },
body: JSON.stringify({
username: `rl_reg_${STAMP}_final`,
email: `rl_reg_${STAMP}_final@example.com`,
password: TEST_PASSWORD,
displayNameEn: "Rate Reg",
}),
});
assert.equal(blocked.status, 429);
});
test("reset-password (and verify) share a per-IP limit returning 429 after the budget", async () => {
const ip = uniqueIp("reset");
// Default reset budget is 10 per 15 min per IP. Mix verify + reset hits to
// confirm both endpoints draw from the same per-IP bucket.
for (let i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
const path = i % 2 === 0 ? "/api/auth/reset-password/verify" : "/api/auth/reset-password";
const body =
i % 2 === 0
? { token: `dummy_${i}` }
: { token: `dummy_${i}`, newPassword: TEST_PASSWORD };
const r = await fetch(`${API_BASE}${path}`, {
method: "POST",
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json", "X-Forwarded-For": ip },
body: JSON.stringify(body),
});
// Verify returns 200 with valid:false; reset returns 400 invalid token.
assert.notEqual(r.status, 429, `attempt ${i + 1} on ${path} unexpectedly throttled`);
}
const blocked = await fetch(`${API_BASE}/api/auth/reset-password`, {
method: "POST",
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json", "X-Forwarded-For": ip },
body: JSON.stringify({ token: "dummy_final", newPassword: TEST_PASSWORD }),
});
assert.equal(blocked.status, 429);
});
test("loopback (no X-Forwarded-For) is exempt in non-production so existing tests don't trip", async () => {
// We've just exhausted several limiters from synthetic IPs above. From
// loopback (the default for direct localhost requests), more attempts
// should still be processed normally — proving the dev-mode skip works.
const username = `rl_loop_${STAMP}`;
await createUser(username);
// Hammer loopback well past every per-IP budget (10/min login).
for (let i = 0; i < 15; i++) {
const r = await fetch(`${API_BASE}/api/auth/login`, {
method: "POST",
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
body: JSON.stringify({ username: `__nope_${STAMP}_${i}`, password: "x" }),
});
// Either 401 (no such user) or 400 (validation) — never 429.
assert.notEqual(r.status, 429, `loopback attempt ${i + 1} unexpectedly throttled`);
}
});