90dc95dc5c
Closes the remaining High-severity finding from
.local/security/manual-review.md: /api/auth/login,
/api/auth/register, /api/auth/forgot-password,
/api/auth/reset-password and /api/auth/reset-password/verify
accepted unlimited attempts, making remote brute-forcing of
weak passwords feasible against the bcrypt cost-10 store.
Changes
-------
- New artifacts/api-server/src/lib/authRateLimit.ts wraps
express-rate-limit into route-level middleware:
* loginIpLimiter — 10 attempts / 60s per IP
* loginUsernameLimiter — 8 attempts / 15min per
trim().toLowerCase() username
* registerIpLimiter — 5 / hour per IP
* forgotPasswordIpLimiter— 5 / 15min per IP
* resetPasswordIpLimiter — 10 / 15min per IP, shared across
/reset-password and /reset-password/verify
* loginLimiters chains IP + username middleware
All thresholds and windows are env-overridable
(AUTH_RATE_LIMIT_*_MAX / *_WINDOW_MS).
Throttled responses are JSON: 429
{ error: "too_many_requests", message: ... }.
In non-production, requests originating from loopback
(127.0.0.1, ::1, ::ffff:127.*) skip the limiter so the
existing test suite — which hammers /auth/login from
loopback — keeps passing. Production never skips. The
AUTH_RATE_LIMIT_FORCE=1 escape hatch flips the skip off
in dev for ad-hoc verification.
- routes/auth.ts: applies the limiters to /auth/register,
/auth/login, /auth/forgot-password, /auth/reset-password,
/auth/reset-password/verify. trust proxy was already set
to 1 in app.ts so X-Forwarded-For from the Replit edge
drives req.ip in production.
- New artifacts/api-server/tests/auth-rate-limit.test.mjs
(6 tests). Each test routes through a unique
X-Forwarded-For 10.x.x.x to bypass the dev loopback skip
while keeping limiter buckets isolated from one another:
1. login per-IP: 10 wrong-cred attempts succeed (401),
11th from the same IP returns 429
2. login per-username: 8 wrong attempts spread across
8 fresh IPs all 401, the 9th attempt for the same
username from yet another fresh IP is 429 — proves
the username bucket blocks credential stuffing
even from rotating IPs
3. forgot-password per-IP: 5 succeed, 6th 429
4. register per-IP: 5 attempts processed, 6th 429
5. reset-password (+verify) shared per-IP: 10 mixed
hits across the two endpoints all processed, 11th 429
6. loopback regression: 15 login attempts from
loopback (no X-Forwarded-For) all return non-429,
proving the dev skip works and existing tests are
unaffected
Test results
------------
- New file: 6/6 pass.
- Full api-server suite: 327/329 pass. The 2 failures
(executive-meetings-notifications meeting_created
socket fan-out, executive-meetings-postpone-race
postpone-minutes B refetches) are pre-existing
concurrency flakes — both fail on main before this
change, both pass when run in isolation, and neither
touches code modified here.
Architect review
----------------
First round flagged missing register + reset-password
test coverage. Both added in this commit. trust-proxy
hardening flagged as advisory; left as-is because the
existing app.ts already sets trust proxy = 1 to match
the single Replit edge hop, and changing it is out of
this task's scope (separate hardening pass).
Residual risk
-------------
- Per-IP buckets rely on app.set("trust proxy", 1) in
app.ts. If the deployment topology ever changes to put
more than one trusted hop in front of the API, the
trust-proxy value must be raised to match — otherwise
attackers could spoof X-Forwarded-For to evade per-IP
limits.
- The username-bucket key is normalized
(trim().toLowerCase()) but does not collapse Unicode
homoglyphs. Acceptable for this app: usernames are
ASCII per RegisterBody validation.
Out of scope
------------
- Helmet, CSRF, session rotation, account-enumeration
on register, bcrypt cost bump, body-size limits — all
remain tracked in .local/security/manual-review.md as
Medium/Low items.
217 lines
8.1 KiB
JavaScript
217 lines
8.1 KiB
JavaScript
import { test, after } from "node:test";
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import assert from "node:assert/strict";
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import pg from "pg";
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const API_BASE = process.env.TEST_API_BASE ?? "http://localhost:8080";
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const DATABASE_URL = process.env.DATABASE_URL;
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if (!DATABASE_URL) throw new Error("DATABASE_URL must be set to run these tests");
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const pool = new pg.Pool({ connectionString: DATABASE_URL });
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const TEST_PASSWORD = "TestPass123!";
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// bcrypt cost 10 hash for TEST_PASSWORD (matches other test files in this repo)
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const TEST_PASSWORD_HASH =
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"$2b$10$Bs636ukPMyz01nKrsi.5m.JlDXSN22AVCvn8cgPWWDbo5yJRQX2vu";
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const STAMP = `${Date.now().toString(36)}_${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`;
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const createdUserIds = [];
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const createdUsernames = [];
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function uniqueIp(suffix) {
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// Pick a non-loopback IPv4 so the rate-limit middleware applies
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// (it skips loopback addresses in non-production).
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const a = (Math.floor(Math.random() * 200) + 11) % 240; // 11..250
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const b = Math.floor(Math.random() * 250) + 1;
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const c = Math.floor(Math.random() * 250) + 1;
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return `10.${a}.${b}.${c}#${suffix}`.split("#")[0];
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}
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async function createUser(username, isActive = true) {
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const { rows } = await pool.query(
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`INSERT INTO users (username, email, password_hash, display_name_en, preferred_language, is_active)
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VALUES ($1, $2, $3, 'Rate Test', 'en', $4) RETURNING id`,
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[username, `${username}@example.com`, TEST_PASSWORD_HASH, isActive],
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);
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const id = rows[0].id;
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createdUserIds.push(id);
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createdUsernames.push(username);
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await pool.query(
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`INSERT INTO user_roles (user_id, role_id)
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SELECT $1, id FROM roles WHERE name = 'user'`,
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[id],
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);
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return id;
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}
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after(async () => {
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if (createdUserIds.length > 0) {
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await pool.query(`DELETE FROM password_reset_tokens WHERE user_id = ANY($1::int[])`, [createdUserIds]);
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await pool.query(`DELETE FROM user_roles WHERE user_id = ANY($1::int[])`, [createdUserIds]);
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await pool.query(`DELETE FROM users WHERE id = ANY($1::int[])`, [createdUserIds]);
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}
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if (createdUsernames.length > 0) {
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await pool.query(`DELETE FROM users WHERE username = ANY($1::text[])`, [createdUsernames]);
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}
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await pool.end();
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});
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async function postLogin({ username, password, ip }) {
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return fetch(`${API_BASE}/api/auth/login`, {
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method: "POST",
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headers: {
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"Content-Type": "application/json",
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"X-Forwarded-For": ip,
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},
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body: JSON.stringify({ username, password }),
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});
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}
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async function postForgot({ identifier, ip }) {
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return fetch(`${API_BASE}/api/auth/forgot-password`, {
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method: "POST",
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headers: {
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"Content-Type": "application/json",
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"X-Forwarded-For": ip,
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},
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body: JSON.stringify({ identifier }),
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});
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}
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test("login: 11th attempt within window from same IP is throttled with 429", async () => {
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const username = `rl_login_${STAMP}`;
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await createUser(username);
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const ip = uniqueIp("login-ip");
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// First 10 with WRONG password from same IP, but with DIFFERENT usernames so
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// we exercise only the per-IP limiter (default 10/min) and not the
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// per-username limiter (default 8/15min).
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for (let i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
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const r = await postLogin({
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username: `rl_login_dummy_${STAMP}_${i}`,
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password: "wrong",
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ip,
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});
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assert.equal(r.status, 401, `attempt ${i + 1} should be 401, got ${r.status}`);
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}
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// 11th attempt from the same IP must be throttled regardless of payload
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const blocked = await postLogin({ username, password: TEST_PASSWORD, ip });
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assert.equal(blocked.status, 429);
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const body = await blocked.json();
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assert.equal(body.error, "too_many_requests");
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});
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test("login: per-username limit blocks credential-stuffing across many IPs", async () => {
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const username = `rl_user_${STAMP}`;
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await createUser(username);
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// 8 wrong-password attempts each from a fresh IP — each one trips the
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// per-username limiter (default max 8) without ever exceeding any single
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// IP's per-IP budget.
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for (let i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
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const r = await postLogin({
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username,
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password: "wrong",
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ip: uniqueIp(`username-${i}`),
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});
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assert.equal(r.status, 401, `attempt ${i + 1} should be 401, got ${r.status}`);
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}
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// 9th attempt from yet another fresh IP must be 429 because the
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// username-keyed limiter is exhausted.
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const blocked = await postLogin({
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username,
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password: TEST_PASSWORD,
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ip: uniqueIp("username-final"),
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});
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assert.equal(blocked.status, 429);
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});
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test("forgot-password: per-IP limit returns 429 after the budget", async () => {
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const ip = uniqueIp("forgot");
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// Default forgot-password budget is 5 per 15 min per IP
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for (let i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
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const r = await postForgot({ identifier: `nobody_${STAMP}_${i}`, ip });
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assert.equal(r.status, 200, `attempt ${i + 1} should be 200, got ${r.status}`);
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}
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const blocked = await postForgot({ identifier: `nobody_${STAMP}_final`, ip });
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assert.equal(blocked.status, 429);
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});
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test("register: per-IP limit returns 429 after the budget", async () => {
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const ip = uniqueIp("register");
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// Default register budget is 5 per hour per IP.
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for (let i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
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const username = `rl_reg_${STAMP}_${i}`;
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createdUsernames.push(username);
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const r = await fetch(`${API_BASE}/api/auth/register`, {
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method: "POST",
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headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json", "X-Forwarded-For": ip },
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body: JSON.stringify({
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username,
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email: `${username}@example.com`,
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password: TEST_PASSWORD,
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displayNameEn: "Rate Reg",
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}),
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});
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// Either 201 (created) or 403 (registration closed) is fine — we only
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// care that the route ran and consumed a slot, not 429.
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assert.notEqual(r.status, 429, `attempt ${i + 1} unexpectedly throttled`);
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}
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const blocked = await fetch(`${API_BASE}/api/auth/register`, {
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method: "POST",
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headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json", "X-Forwarded-For": ip },
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body: JSON.stringify({
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username: `rl_reg_${STAMP}_final`,
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email: `rl_reg_${STAMP}_final@example.com`,
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password: TEST_PASSWORD,
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displayNameEn: "Rate Reg",
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}),
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});
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assert.equal(blocked.status, 429);
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});
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test("reset-password (and verify) share a per-IP limit returning 429 after the budget", async () => {
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const ip = uniqueIp("reset");
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// Default reset budget is 10 per 15 min per IP. Mix verify + reset hits to
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// confirm both endpoints draw from the same per-IP bucket.
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for (let i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
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const path = i % 2 === 0 ? "/api/auth/reset-password/verify" : "/api/auth/reset-password";
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const body =
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i % 2 === 0
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? { token: `dummy_${i}` }
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: { token: `dummy_${i}`, newPassword: TEST_PASSWORD };
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const r = await fetch(`${API_BASE}${path}`, {
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method: "POST",
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headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json", "X-Forwarded-For": ip },
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body: JSON.stringify(body),
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});
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// Verify returns 200 with valid:false; reset returns 400 invalid token.
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assert.notEqual(r.status, 429, `attempt ${i + 1} on ${path} unexpectedly throttled`);
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}
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const blocked = await fetch(`${API_BASE}/api/auth/reset-password`, {
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method: "POST",
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headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json", "X-Forwarded-For": ip },
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body: JSON.stringify({ token: "dummy_final", newPassword: TEST_PASSWORD }),
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});
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assert.equal(blocked.status, 429);
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});
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test("loopback (no X-Forwarded-For) is exempt in non-production so existing tests don't trip", async () => {
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// We've just exhausted several limiters from synthetic IPs above. From
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// loopback (the default for direct localhost requests), more attempts
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// should still be processed normally — proving the dev-mode skip works.
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const username = `rl_loop_${STAMP}`;
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await createUser(username);
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// Hammer loopback well past every per-IP budget (10/min login).
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for (let i = 0; i < 15; i++) {
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const r = await fetch(`${API_BASE}/api/auth/login`, {
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method: "POST",
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headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
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body: JSON.stringify({ username: `__nope_${STAMP}_${i}`, password: "x" }),
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});
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// Either 401 (no such user) or 400 (validation) — never 429.
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assert.notEqual(r.status, 429, `loopback attempt ${i + 1} unexpectedly throttled`);
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}
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});
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