Files
TX/artifacts/api-server/tests/app-permissions-impact.test.mjs
T
riyadhafraa b507b33cad Add app-permissions impact preview before tightening an app's gate
Mirrors the existing role-permissions impact preview UX for app
permissions. Admins now see how many currently-visible users would lose
access before they add a permission requirement to an app, plus the
groups (via group_apps) that offset the loss because their members keep
access regardless.

Backend
- New endpoint POST /api/apps/:id/permissions/impact-preview in
  artifacts/api-server/src/routes/apps.ts. Implements the same OR
  semantics as getVisibleAppsForUser: a user "sees" an app if they hold
  ANY required permission (direct or via a group role) OR they belong
  to a group granted the app via group_apps. Admins are excluded from
  counts since they always see every app. Short-circuits with
  noChange:true when the candidate set equals the current set.
- OpenAPI schema (lib/api-spec/openapi.yaml): adds the path,
  AppPermissionsImpactBody, AppPermissionImpactGroup,
  AppPermissionsImpact. Regenerated lib/api-client-react bindings.

Frontend
- AppPermissionsEditor (artifacts/tx-os/src/pages/admin.tsx): debounced
  (350ms) cancel-safe preview when a pending permission is selected,
  warning banner with affected/visible counts and offsetting groups,
  and a confirmation dialog when affectedUserCount > 0. Add button is
  disabled while the preview is loading or errored to keep the warning
  trustworthy.
- i18n keys added to en.json and ar.json under
  admin.appPermissions.{impactTitle, impactLoading, impactError,
  impactNone, impactSummary, impactViaGroups, confirmTitle, confirmBody,
  confirmAction}.

Tests
- artifacts/api-server/tests/app-permissions-impact.test.mjs: 7 tests
  covering noChange short-circuit, unrestricted-app tightening,
  candidate that keeps an existing permission, group_apps offset,
  unknown app (404), invalid payload (400), and admin-only enforcement.
  All 18 app-permissions tests pass.
- E2E flow verified via runTest: admin login → /admin → Apps → edit
  app → select permission → preview banner appears → Add → confirm
  dialog → cancel without writing.

Out-of-scope (filed as follow-ups #228 and #229): listing the specific
affected user IDs in the preview, and warning when REMOVING a
permission broadens access.

No deviations from the task spec.

Replit-Task-Id: 8b2ff9ea-f95e-4bdb-b268-95b5d17154ca
2026-04-30 18:03:08 +00:00

442 lines
16 KiB
JavaScript

import { test, before, after } from "node:test";
import assert from "node:assert/strict";
import pg from "pg";
const API_BASE = process.env.TEST_API_BASE ?? "http://localhost:8080";
const DATABASE_URL = process.env.DATABASE_URL;
if (!DATABASE_URL) {
throw new Error("DATABASE_URL must be set to run these tests");
}
const TEST_PASSWORD = "TestPass123!";
const TEST_PASSWORD_HASH =
"$2b$10$Bs636ukPMyz01nKrsi.5m.JlDXSN22AVCvn8cgPWWDbo5yJRQX2vu";
const pool = new pg.Pool({ connectionString: DATABASE_URL });
let adminUsername;
let adminCookie;
let consumerUsername;
let consumerCookie;
const createdAppIds = [];
const createdPermissionIds = [];
const createdRoleIds = [];
const createdGroupIds = [];
const createdUserIds = [];
let appId;
let permA;
let permB;
let permC;
let roleA;
let roleB;
let roleC;
let userA; // direct role A only — has permA
let userAB; // direct roles A and B — has permA and permB
let userViaGroup; // in a group that has role A — has permA via group
let helperGroupId;
let groupGrantedAppId; // app explicitly granted to a group via group_apps
let groupAppGrantUserId; // member of that group; sees the app even with no perms
let groupAppGroupId;
async function login(username, password) {
const res = await fetch(`${API_BASE}/api/auth/login`, {
method: "POST",
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
body: JSON.stringify({ username, password }),
});
assert.equal(res.status, 200, `login expected 200, got ${res.status}`);
const setCookie = res.headers.get("set-cookie");
return setCookie
.split(",")
.map((c) => c.split(";")[0].trim())
.find((c) => c.startsWith("connect.sid="));
}
async function makeUser(prefix, stamp) {
const username = `${prefix}_${stamp}`;
const r = await pool.query(
`INSERT INTO users (username, email, password_hash, display_name_en, preferred_language, is_active)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, 'en', true) RETURNING id`,
[
username,
`${username}@example.com`,
TEST_PASSWORD_HASH,
`${prefix} User`,
],
);
const id = r.rows[0].id;
createdUserIds.push(id);
return { id, username };
}
async function makePermission(prefix, stamp) {
const r = await pool.query(
`INSERT INTO permissions (name, description_en) VALUES ($1, $2) RETURNING id, name`,
[`${prefix}.${stamp}`, `${prefix} permission`],
);
const row = r.rows[0];
createdPermissionIds.push(row.id);
return row;
}
async function makeRole(prefix, stamp, perms) {
const r = await pool.query(
`INSERT INTO roles (name, description_en) VALUES ($1, $2) RETURNING id`,
[`${prefix}_${stamp}`, `${prefix} role`],
);
const id = r.rows[0].id;
createdRoleIds.push(id);
for (const p of perms) {
await pool.query(
`INSERT INTO role_permissions (role_id, permission_id) VALUES ($1, $2)`,
[id, p.id],
);
}
return id;
}
async function makeGroup(prefix, stamp) {
const r = await pool.query(
`INSERT INTO groups (name, description_en) VALUES ($1, $2) RETURNING id`,
[`${prefix}_${stamp}`, `${prefix} group`],
);
const id = r.rows[0].id;
createdGroupIds.push(id);
return id;
}
async function makeApp(prefix, stamp) {
const slug = `${prefix}_${stamp}`;
const r = await pool.query(
`INSERT INTO apps (slug, name_ar, name_en, route, is_active, sort_order)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, true, 999) RETURNING id`,
[slug, slug, slug, `/${slug}`],
);
const id = r.rows[0].id;
createdAppIds.push(id);
return id;
}
before(async () => {
const stamp = `${Date.now().toString(36)}_${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 6)}`;
// Admin user (granted system-wide admin role).
const admin = await makeUser("api_admin", stamp);
adminUsername = admin.username;
await pool.query(
`INSERT INTO user_roles (user_id, role_id) SELECT $1, id FROM roles WHERE name = 'admin'`,
[admin.id],
);
// Plain consumer (used to verify the endpoint requires admin).
const consumer = await makeUser("api_consumer", stamp);
consumerUsername = consumer.username;
adminCookie = await login(adminUsername, TEST_PASSWORD);
consumerCookie = await login(consumerUsername, TEST_PASSWORD);
permA = await makePermission("api.perm.a", stamp);
permB = await makePermission("api.perm.b", stamp);
permC = await makePermission("api.perm.c", stamp);
roleA = await makeRole("api_role_a", stamp, [permA]);
roleB = await makeRole("api_role_b", stamp, [permB]);
roleC = await makeRole("api_role_c", stamp, [permC]);
// userA: direct roleA → has permA.
({ id: userA } = await makeUser("api_user_a", stamp));
await pool.query(
`INSERT INTO user_roles (user_id, role_id) VALUES ($1, $2)`,
[userA, roleA],
);
// userAB: direct roles A and B → has permA and permB.
({ id: userAB } = await makeUser("api_user_ab", stamp));
await pool.query(
`INSERT INTO user_roles (user_id, role_id) VALUES ($1, $2), ($1, $3)`,
[userAB, roleA, roleB],
);
// userViaGroup: gets roleA via membership in helperGroup → has permA via group.
({ id: userViaGroup } = await makeUser("api_user_viagrp", stamp));
helperGroupId = await makeGroup("api_helper_grp", stamp);
await pool.query(
`INSERT INTO user_groups (user_id, group_id) VALUES ($1, $2)`,
[userViaGroup, helperGroupId],
);
await pool.query(
`INSERT INTO group_roles (group_id, role_id) VALUES ($1, $2)`,
[helperGroupId, roleA],
);
// App that we will run impact previews against.
appId = await makeApp("api_impact_app", stamp);
// Separate scenario for the group-grant offset: an app with no permissions
// but explicitly granted to a group via group_apps. A member of that group
// sees the app even after we add a permission requirement they don't have.
groupGrantedAppId = await makeApp("api_grpapp", stamp);
groupAppGroupId = await makeGroup("api_grpapp_grp", stamp);
await pool.query(
`INSERT INTO group_apps (group_id, app_id) VALUES ($1, $2)`,
[groupAppGroupId, groupGrantedAppId],
);
({ id: groupAppGrantUserId } = await makeUser("api_grpapp_user", stamp));
await pool.query(
`INSERT INTO user_groups (user_id, group_id) VALUES ($1, $2)`,
[groupAppGrantUserId, groupAppGroupId],
);
});
after(async () => {
if (createdAppIds.length) {
await pool.query(
`DELETE FROM app_permissions WHERE app_id = ANY($1::int[])`,
[createdAppIds],
);
await pool.query(
`DELETE FROM group_apps WHERE app_id = ANY($1::int[])`,
[createdAppIds],
);
await pool.query(`DELETE FROM apps WHERE id = ANY($1::int[])`, [
createdAppIds,
]);
}
if (createdRoleIds.length) {
await pool.query(`DELETE FROM user_roles WHERE role_id = ANY($1::int[])`, [
createdRoleIds,
]);
await pool.query(`DELETE FROM group_roles WHERE role_id = ANY($1::int[])`, [
createdRoleIds,
]);
await pool.query(
`DELETE FROM role_permissions WHERE role_id = ANY($1::int[])`,
[createdRoleIds],
);
await pool.query(`DELETE FROM roles WHERE id = ANY($1::int[])`, [
createdRoleIds,
]);
}
if (createdGroupIds.length) {
await pool.query(
`DELETE FROM group_roles WHERE group_id = ANY($1::int[])`,
[createdGroupIds],
);
await pool.query(
`DELETE FROM user_groups WHERE group_id = ANY($1::int[])`,
[createdGroupIds],
);
await pool.query(
`DELETE FROM group_apps WHERE group_id = ANY($1::int[])`,
[createdGroupIds],
);
await pool.query(`DELETE FROM groups WHERE id = ANY($1::int[])`, [
createdGroupIds,
]);
}
if (createdPermissionIds.length) {
await pool.query(
`DELETE FROM role_permissions WHERE permission_id = ANY($1::int[])`,
[createdPermissionIds],
);
await pool.query(
`DELETE FROM app_permissions WHERE permission_id = ANY($1::int[])`,
[createdPermissionIds],
);
await pool.query(`DELETE FROM permissions WHERE id = ANY($1::int[])`, [
createdPermissionIds,
]);
}
for (const uid of createdUserIds) {
await pool.query(`DELETE FROM user_groups WHERE user_id = $1`, [uid]);
await pool.query(`DELETE FROM user_roles WHERE user_id = $1`, [uid]);
await pool.query(`DELETE FROM users WHERE id = $1`, [uid]);
}
await pool.end();
});
async function preview(appIdToCheck, permissionIds, cookie = adminCookie) {
return fetch(
`${API_BASE}/api/apps/${appIdToCheck}/permissions/impact-preview`,
{
method: "POST",
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json", Cookie: cookie },
body: JSON.stringify({ permissionIds }),
},
);
}
test("preview short-circuits with noChange=true when candidate matches current set", async () => {
// Seed app with permA so the candidate exactly matches.
await pool.query(
`INSERT INTO app_permissions (app_id, permission_id) VALUES ($1, $2)
ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING`,
[appId, permA.id],
);
try {
const res = await preview(appId, [permA.id]);
assert.equal(res.status, 200);
const body = await res.json();
assert.equal(body.noChange, true);
assert.equal(body.affectedUserCount, 0);
// currentlyVisibleUserCount must be the real audience size — not
// hardcoded to 0 — so consumers reading a noChange response still
// get an accurate count of how many users currently see the app.
// At minimum userA, userAB, and userViaGroup hold permA and should
// appear in the count.
assert.ok(
body.currentlyVisibleUserCount >= 3,
`expected currentlyVisibleUserCount >= 3, got ${body.currentlyVisibleUserCount}`,
);
assert.deepEqual(body.groups, []);
} finally {
await pool.query(
`DELETE FROM app_permissions WHERE app_id = $1 AND permission_id = $2`,
[appId, permA.id],
);
}
});
test("preview reports affected users when adding a permission requirement to an unrestricted app", async () => {
// App is currently unrestricted — every non-admin user can see it.
// Candidate: require permB. Only userAB has permB.
// Expected: at minimum, userA and userViaGroup lose access (they have
// permA only). Other unrelated users in the DB also currently see the
// app (since it's unrestricted), so we use a >= assertion to stay
// robust against test data drift in the surrounding DB.
const res = await preview(appId, [permB.id]);
assert.equal(res.status, 200);
const body = await res.json();
assert.equal(body.noChange, false);
// Sanity: a positive number of users currently see the unrestricted app
// and at least the two test users without permB lose access.
assert.ok(body.currentlyVisibleUserCount >= 3);
assert.ok(
body.affectedUserCount >= 2,
`expected at least 2 affected, got ${body.affectedUserCount}`,
);
// userAB has permB so they keep access — affected must be strictly less
// than currently visible.
assert.ok(body.affectedUserCount < body.currentlyVisibleUserCount);
});
test("preview narrows affected users when candidate keeps a permission they already hold", async () => {
// Seed the app with permA AND permB required (OR semantics: holding
// either one grants visibility). Then ask "what if we remove permB?"
// — which keeps permA. Only users who exclusively have permB lose
// access, so userA and userViaGroup are unaffected (they still have
// permA). userAB also keeps access via permA.
await pool.query(
`INSERT INTO app_permissions (app_id, permission_id) VALUES
($1, $2), ($1, $3) ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING`,
[appId, permA.id, permB.id],
);
try {
const res = await preview(appId, [permA.id]);
assert.equal(res.status, 200);
const body = await res.json();
assert.equal(body.noChange, false);
// None of our scenario users should lose access since they all have
// permA (or are in a group that grants permA). Other users in the
// surrounding DB might lose access if they only had permB, but our
// three tracked users must NOT.
// We verify by sanity-checking that currentlyVisibleUserCount stays
// sensible; the strict invariant we rely on is the comparison below.
assert.ok(body.currentlyVisibleUserCount >= 3);
// affected must be < currentlyVisibleUserCount because userA, userAB
// and userViaGroup all keep access via permA.
assert.ok(body.affectedUserCount < body.currentlyVisibleUserCount);
} finally {
await pool.query(
`DELETE FROM app_permissions WHERE app_id = $1 AND permission_id IN ($2, $3)`,
[appId, permA.id, permB.id],
);
}
});
test("preview surfaces groups that grant the app via group_apps and they offset the loss", async () => {
// groupGrantedAppId is unrestricted and explicitly granted to
// groupAppGroupId. Adding a requirement that no test user holds
// (permC, only assigned to roleC, which nobody in our scenario has)
// would otherwise hide the app from groupAppGrantUserId — but that
// user is in a group that grants the app, so they keep access.
const res = await preview(groupGrantedAppId, [permC.id]);
assert.equal(res.status, 200);
const body = await res.json();
assert.equal(body.noChange, false);
// Groups list must include the group that grants the app.
const groupNames = body.groups.map((g) => g.id);
assert.ok(
groupNames.includes(groupAppGroupId),
`expected groups to include ${groupAppGroupId}, got ${JSON.stringify(body.groups)}`,
);
// groupAppGrantUserId must NOT be counted as affected — they keep
// access via the group_apps grant. We can't directly read the affected
// user IDs (the endpoint only returns counts), but we can prove the
// offset works by re-running the preview against an *identical app*
// without the group-grant and confirming the count is strictly higher
// by at least 1. We achieve this by inserting and removing a
// group_apps row on the same app.
await pool.query(
`DELETE FROM group_apps WHERE group_id = $1 AND app_id = $2`,
[groupAppGroupId, groupGrantedAppId],
);
try {
const without = await preview(groupGrantedAppId, [permC.id]);
assert.equal(without.status, 200);
const wbody = await without.json();
// Removing the group grant should INCREASE affectedUserCount by at
// least 1 (groupAppGrantUserId now has no offset).
assert.ok(
wbody.affectedUserCount >= body.affectedUserCount + 1,
`expected affected count to grow when group_apps offset is removed (with offset: ${body.affectedUserCount}, without: ${wbody.affectedUserCount})`,
);
} finally {
// Restore the grant so other tests / cleanup remain happy.
await pool.query(
`INSERT INTO group_apps (group_id, app_id) VALUES ($1, $2)
ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING`,
[groupAppGroupId, groupGrantedAppId],
);
}
});
test("preview returns 404 for an unknown app", async () => {
const max = await pool.query(`SELECT COALESCE(MAX(id), 0) AS m FROM apps`);
const unknownId = max.rows[0].m + 9999;
const res = await preview(unknownId, [permA.id]);
assert.equal(res.status, 404);
});
test("preview returns 400 when permissionIds is missing or invalid", async () => {
const noBody = await fetch(
`${API_BASE}/api/apps/${appId}/permissions/impact-preview`,
{
method: "POST",
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json", Cookie: adminCookie },
body: JSON.stringify({}),
},
);
assert.equal(noBody.status, 400);
const wrong = await fetch(
`${API_BASE}/api/apps/${appId}/permissions/impact-preview`,
{
method: "POST",
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json", Cookie: adminCookie },
body: JSON.stringify({ permissionIds: ["abc"] }),
},
);
assert.equal(wrong.status, 400);
});
test("preview requires admin", async () => {
const res = await preview(appId, [permA.id], consumerCookie);
assert.ok(
res.status === 401 || res.status === 403,
`expected 401/403, got ${res.status}`,
);
});