Task #525: Auth endpoint rate limiting (MR-H3)

Closes the remaining High-severity finding from
.local/security/manual-review.md: /api/auth/login,
/api/auth/register, /api/auth/forgot-password,
/api/auth/reset-password and /api/auth/reset-password/verify
accepted unlimited attempts, making remote brute-forcing of
weak passwords feasible against the bcrypt cost-10 store.

Changes
-------
- New artifacts/api-server/src/lib/authRateLimit.ts wraps
  express-rate-limit into route-level middleware:
  * loginIpLimiter         — 10 attempts / 60s per IP
  * loginUsernameLimiter   — 8 attempts / 15min per
                             trim().toLowerCase() username
  * registerIpLimiter      — 5 / hour per IP
  * forgotPasswordIpLimiter— 5 / 15min per IP
  * resetPasswordIpLimiter — 10 / 15min per IP, shared across
                             /reset-password and /reset-password/verify
  * loginLimiters chains IP + username middleware
  All thresholds and windows are env-overridable
  (AUTH_RATE_LIMIT_*_MAX / *_WINDOW_MS).
  Throttled responses are JSON: 429
  { error: "too_many_requests", message: ... }.
  In non-production, requests originating from loopback
  (127.0.0.1, ::1, ::ffff:127.*) skip the limiter so the
  existing test suite — which hammers /auth/login from
  loopback — keeps passing. Production never skips. The
  AUTH_RATE_LIMIT_FORCE=1 escape hatch flips the skip off
  in dev for ad-hoc verification.

- routes/auth.ts: applies the limiters to /auth/register,
  /auth/login, /auth/forgot-password, /auth/reset-password,
  /auth/reset-password/verify. trust proxy was already set
  to 1 in app.ts so X-Forwarded-For from the Replit edge
  drives req.ip in production.

- New artifacts/api-server/tests/auth-rate-limit.test.mjs
  (6 tests). Each test routes through a unique
  X-Forwarded-For 10.x.x.x to bypass the dev loopback skip
  while keeping limiter buckets isolated from one another:
    1. login per-IP: 10 wrong-cred attempts succeed (401),
       11th from the same IP returns 429
    2. login per-username: 8 wrong attempts spread across
       8 fresh IPs all 401, the 9th attempt for the same
       username from yet another fresh IP is 429 — proves
       the username bucket blocks credential stuffing
       even from rotating IPs
    3. forgot-password per-IP: 5 succeed, 6th 429
    4. register per-IP: 5 attempts processed, 6th 429
    5. reset-password (+verify) shared per-IP: 10 mixed
       hits across the two endpoints all processed, 11th 429
    6. loopback regression: 15 login attempts from
       loopback (no X-Forwarded-For) all return non-429,
       proving the dev skip works and existing tests are
       unaffected

Test results
------------
- New file: 6/6 pass.
- Full api-server suite: 327/329 pass. The 2 failures
  (executive-meetings-notifications meeting_created
  socket fan-out, executive-meetings-postpone-race
  postpone-minutes B refetches) are pre-existing
  concurrency flakes — both fail on main before this
  change, both pass when run in isolation, and neither
  touches code modified here.

Architect review
----------------
First round flagged missing register + reset-password
test coverage. Both added in this commit. trust-proxy
hardening flagged as advisory; left as-is because the
existing app.ts already sets trust proxy = 1 to match
the single Replit edge hop, and changing it is out of
this task's scope (separate hardening pass).

Residual risk
-------------
- Per-IP buckets rely on app.set("trust proxy", 1) in
  app.ts. If the deployment topology ever changes to put
  more than one trusted hop in front of the API, the
  trust-proxy value must be raised to match — otherwise
  attackers could spoof X-Forwarded-For to evade per-IP
  limits.
- The username-bucket key is normalized
  (trim().toLowerCase()) but does not collapse Unicode
  homoglyphs. Acceptable for this app: usernames are
  ASCII per RegisterBody validation.

Out of scope
------------
- Helmet, CSRF, session rotation, account-enumeration
  on register, bcrypt cost bump, body-size limits — all
  remain tracked in .local/security/manual-review.md as
  Medium/Low items.

artifacts/api-server/package.json

@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
     "cors": "^2",
     "drizzle-orm": "catalog:",
     "express": "^5",
+    "express-rate-limit": "^8.5.1",
     "express-session": "^1.19.0",
     "google-auth-library": "^10.6.2",
     "nodemailer": "^8.0.7",

artifacts/api-server/src/lib/authRateLimit.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+import { rateLimit, ipKeyGenerator, type RateLimitRequestHandler } from "express-rate-limit";
+import type { Request, Response, NextFunction, RequestHandler } from "express";
+
+const isProduction = process.env.NODE_ENV === "production";
+
+function envInt(name: string, fallback: number): number {
+  const raw = process.env[name];
+  if (raw == null || raw === "") return fallback;
+  const n = Number(raw);
+  return Number.isFinite(n) && n > 0 ? Math.floor(n) : fallback;
+}
+
+function isLoopback(ip: string | undefined): boolean {
+  if (!ip) return false;
+  if (ip === "127.0.0.1" || ip === "::1") return true;
+  if (ip.startsWith("::ffff:127.")) return true;
+  return false;
+}
+
+function skipForLocalDev(req: Request): boolean {
+  if (isProduction) return false;
+  if (process.env.AUTH_RATE_LIMIT_FORCE === "1") return false;
+  return isLoopback(req.ip);
+}
+
+function jsonHandler(req: Request, res: Response): void {
+  res.status(429).json({
+    error: "too_many_requests",
+    message: "Too many attempts. Please slow down and try again later.",
+  });
+}
+
+export const loginIpLimiter: RateLimitRequestHandler = rateLimit({
+  windowMs: envInt("AUTH_RATE_LIMIT_LOGIN_WINDOW_MS", 60_000),
+  max: envInt("AUTH_RATE_LIMIT_LOGIN_MAX", 10),
+  standardHeaders: true,
+  legacyHeaders: false,
+  skip: skipForLocalDev,
+  handler: jsonHandler,
+});
+
+export const registerIpLimiter: RateLimitRequestHandler = rateLimit({
+  windowMs: envInt("AUTH_RATE_LIMIT_REGISTER_WINDOW_MS", 60 * 60_000),
+  max: envInt("AUTH_RATE_LIMIT_REGISTER_MAX", 5),
+  standardHeaders: true,
+  legacyHeaders: false,
+  skip: skipForLocalDev,
+  handler: jsonHandler,
+});
+
+export const forgotPasswordIpLimiter: RateLimitRequestHandler = rateLimit({
+  windowMs: envInt("AUTH_RATE_LIMIT_FORGOT_WINDOW_MS", 15 * 60_000),
+  max: envInt("AUTH_RATE_LIMIT_FORGOT_MAX", 5),
+  standardHeaders: true,
+  legacyHeaders: false,
+  skip: skipForLocalDev,
+  handler: jsonHandler,
+});
+
+export const resetPasswordIpLimiter: RateLimitRequestHandler = rateLimit({
+  windowMs: envInt("AUTH_RATE_LIMIT_RESET_WINDOW_MS", 15 * 60_000),
+  max: envInt("AUTH_RATE_LIMIT_RESET_MAX", 10),
+  standardHeaders: true,
+  legacyHeaders: false,
+  skip: skipForLocalDev,
+  handler: jsonHandler,
+});
+
+export const loginUsernameLimiter: RateLimitRequestHandler = rateLimit({
+  windowMs: envInt("AUTH_RATE_LIMIT_LOGIN_USERNAME_WINDOW_MS", 15 * 60_000),
+  max: envInt("AUTH_RATE_LIMIT_LOGIN_USERNAME_MAX", 8),
+  standardHeaders: true,
+  legacyHeaders: false,
+  skip: (req: Request) => {
+    if (skipForLocalDev(req)) return true;
+    const username =
+      typeof req.body?.username === "string" ? req.body.username.trim() : "";
+    return username.length === 0;
+  },
+  keyGenerator: (req: Request) => {
+    const username =
+      typeof req.body?.username === "string"
+        ? req.body.username.trim().toLowerCase()
+        : "";
+    return `username:${username}`;
+  },
+  handler: jsonHandler,
+});
+
+function chain(...mws: RequestHandler[]): RequestHandler {
+  return (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => {
+    let i = 0;
+    const run = (err?: unknown): void => {
+      if (err) return next(err as Error);
+      const mw = mws[i++];
+      if (!mw) return next();
+      mw(req, res, run);
+    };
+    run();
+  };
+}
+
+export const loginLimiters: RequestHandler = chain(
+  loginIpLimiter,
+  loginUsernameLimiter,
+);
+export const registerLimiters: RequestHandler = registerIpLimiter;
+export const forgotPasswordLimiters: RequestHandler = forgotPasswordIpLimiter;
+export const resetPasswordLimiters: RequestHandler = resetPasswordIpLimiter;
+
+export { ipKeyGenerator };

artifacts/api-server/src/routes/auth.ts

@@ -15,6 +15,12 @@ import {
 } from "@workspace/db";
 import { requireAuth, requireAdmin, getUserRoles } from "../middlewares/auth";
 import { saveSession, destroySession } from "../lib/session";
+import {
+  loginLimiters,
+  registerLimiters,
+  forgotPasswordLimiters,
+  resetPasswordLimiters,
+} from "../lib/authRateLimit";
 import {
   RegisterBody,
   LoginBody,
@@ -78,7 +84,7 @@ function buildAuthUser(
   };
 }
 
-router.post("/auth/register", async (req, res): Promise<void> => {
+router.post("/auth/register", registerLimiters, async (req, res): Promise<void> => {
   const parsed = RegisterBody.safeParse(req.body);
   if (!parsed.success) {
     res.status(400).json({ error: parsed.error.message });
@@ -140,7 +146,7 @@ router.post("/auth/register", async (req, res): Promise<void> => {
   res.status(201).json(buildAuthUser(user, roles, await getUserGroupsForAuth(user.id)));
 });
 
-router.post("/auth/login", async (req, res): Promise<void> => {
+router.post("/auth/login", loginLimiters, async (req, res): Promise<void> => {
   const parsed = LoginBody.safeParse(req.body);
   if (!parsed.success) {
     res.status(400).json({ error: parsed.error.message });
@@ -176,7 +182,7 @@ router.post("/auth/login", async (req, res): Promise<void> => {
   res.json(buildAuthUser(user, roles, await getUserGroupsForAuth(user.id)));
 });
 
-router.post("/auth/forgot-password", async (req, res): Promise<void> => {
+router.post("/auth/forgot-password", forgotPasswordLimiters, async (req, res): Promise<void> => {
   const parsed = ForgotPasswordBody.safeParse(req.body);
   if (!parsed.success) {
     res.status(400).json({ error: parsed.error.message });
@@ -214,7 +220,7 @@ router.post("/auth/forgot-password", async (req, res): Promise<void> => {
   res.json({ success: true });
 });
 
-router.post("/auth/reset-password/verify", async (req, res): Promise<void> => {
+router.post("/auth/reset-password/verify", resetPasswordLimiters, async (req, res): Promise<void> => {
   const parsed = VerifyResetTokenBody.safeParse(req.body);
   if (!parsed.success) {
     res.status(400).json({ error: parsed.error.message });
@@ -236,7 +242,7 @@ router.post("/auth/reset-password/verify", async (req, res): Promise<void> => {
   res.json({ valid: Boolean(record) });
 });
 
-router.post("/auth/reset-password", async (req, res): Promise<void> => {
+router.post("/auth/reset-password", resetPasswordLimiters, async (req, res): Promise<void> => {
   const parsed = ResetPasswordBody.safeParse(req.body);
   if (!parsed.success) {
     res.status(400).json({ error: parsed.error.message });

artifacts/api-server/tests/auth-rate-limit.test.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
+import { test, after } from "node:test";
+import assert from "node:assert/strict";
+import pg from "pg";
+
+const API_BASE = process.env.TEST_API_BASE ?? "http://localhost:8080";
+const DATABASE_URL = process.env.DATABASE_URL;
+if (!DATABASE_URL) throw new Error("DATABASE_URL must be set to run these tests");
+
+const pool = new pg.Pool({ connectionString: DATABASE_URL });
+const TEST_PASSWORD = "TestPass123!";
+// bcrypt cost 10 hash for TEST_PASSWORD (matches other test files in this repo)
+const TEST_PASSWORD_HASH =
+  "$2b$10$Bs636ukPMyz01nKrsi.5m.JlDXSN22AVCvn8cgPWWDbo5yJRQX2vu";
+
+const STAMP = `${Date.now().toString(36)}_${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`;
+const createdUserIds = [];
+const createdUsernames = [];
+
+function uniqueIp(suffix) {
+  // Pick a non-loopback IPv4 so the rate-limit middleware applies
+  // (it skips loopback addresses in non-production).
+  const a = (Math.floor(Math.random() * 200) + 11) % 240; // 11..250
+  const b = Math.floor(Math.random() * 250) + 1;
+  const c = Math.floor(Math.random() * 250) + 1;
+  return `10.${a}.${b}.${c}#${suffix}`.split("#")[0];
+}
+
+async function createUser(username, isActive = true) {
+  const { rows } = await pool.query(
+    `INSERT INTO users (username, email, password_hash, display_name_en, preferred_language, is_active)
+     VALUES ($1, $2, $3, 'Rate Test', 'en', $4) RETURNING id`,
+    [username, `${username}@example.com`, TEST_PASSWORD_HASH, isActive],
+  );
+  const id = rows[0].id;
+  createdUserIds.push(id);
+  createdUsernames.push(username);
+  await pool.query(
+    `INSERT INTO user_roles (user_id, role_id)
+     SELECT $1, id FROM roles WHERE name = 'user'`,
+    [id],
+  );
+  return id;
+}
+
+after(async () => {
+  if (createdUserIds.length > 0) {
+    await pool.query(`DELETE FROM password_reset_tokens WHERE user_id = ANY($1::int[])`, [createdUserIds]);
+    await pool.query(`DELETE FROM user_roles WHERE user_id = ANY($1::int[])`, [createdUserIds]);
+    await pool.query(`DELETE FROM users WHERE id = ANY($1::int[])`, [createdUserIds]);
+  }
+  if (createdUsernames.length > 0) {
+    await pool.query(`DELETE FROM users WHERE username = ANY($1::text[])`, [createdUsernames]);
+  }
+  await pool.end();
+});
+
+async function postLogin({ username, password, ip }) {
+  return fetch(`${API_BASE}/api/auth/login`, {
+    method: "POST",
+    headers: {
+      "Content-Type": "application/json",
+      "X-Forwarded-For": ip,
+    },
+    body: JSON.stringify({ username, password }),
+  });
+}
+
+async function postForgot({ identifier, ip }) {
+  return fetch(`${API_BASE}/api/auth/forgot-password`, {
+    method: "POST",
+    headers: {
+      "Content-Type": "application/json",
+      "X-Forwarded-For": ip,
+    },
+    body: JSON.stringify({ identifier }),
+  });
+}
+
+test("login: 11th attempt within window from same IP is throttled with 429", async () => {
+  const username = `rl_login_${STAMP}`;
+  await createUser(username);
+  const ip = uniqueIp("login-ip");
+
+  // First 10 with WRONG password from same IP, but with DIFFERENT usernames so
+  // we exercise only the per-IP limiter (default 10/min) and not the
+  // per-username limiter (default 8/15min).
+  for (let i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
+    const r = await postLogin({
+      username: `rl_login_dummy_${STAMP}_${i}`,
+      password: "wrong",
+      ip,
+    });
+    assert.equal(r.status, 401, `attempt ${i + 1} should be 401, got ${r.status}`);
+  }
+
+  // 11th attempt from the same IP must be throttled regardless of payload
+  const blocked = await postLogin({ username, password: TEST_PASSWORD, ip });
+  assert.equal(blocked.status, 429);
+  const body = await blocked.json();
+  assert.equal(body.error, "too_many_requests");
+});
+
+test("login: per-username limit blocks credential-stuffing across many IPs", async () => {
+  const username = `rl_user_${STAMP}`;
+  await createUser(username);
+
+  // 8 wrong-password attempts each from a fresh IP — each one trips the
+  // per-username limiter (default max 8) without ever exceeding any single
+  // IP's per-IP budget.
+  for (let i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+    const r = await postLogin({
+      username,
+      password: "wrong",
+      ip: uniqueIp(`username-${i}`),
+    });
+    assert.equal(r.status, 401, `attempt ${i + 1} should be 401, got ${r.status}`);
+  }
+
+  // 9th attempt from yet another fresh IP must be 429 because the
+  // username-keyed limiter is exhausted.
+  const blocked = await postLogin({
+    username,
+    password: TEST_PASSWORD,
+    ip: uniqueIp("username-final"),
+  });
+  assert.equal(blocked.status, 429);
+});
+
+test("forgot-password: per-IP limit returns 429 after the budget", async () => {
+  const ip = uniqueIp("forgot");
+  // Default forgot-password budget is 5 per 15 min per IP
+  for (let i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
+    const r = await postForgot({ identifier: `nobody_${STAMP}_${i}`, ip });
+    assert.equal(r.status, 200, `attempt ${i + 1} should be 200, got ${r.status}`);
+  }
+  const blocked = await postForgot({ identifier: `nobody_${STAMP}_final`, ip });
+  assert.equal(blocked.status, 429);
+});
+
+test("register: per-IP limit returns 429 after the budget", async () => {
+  const ip = uniqueIp("register");
+  // Default register budget is 5 per hour per IP.
+  for (let i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
+    const username = `rl_reg_${STAMP}_${i}`;
+    createdUsernames.push(username);
+    const r = await fetch(`${API_BASE}/api/auth/register`, {
+      method: "POST",
+      headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json", "X-Forwarded-For": ip },
+      body: JSON.stringify({
+        username,
+        email: `${username}@example.com`,
+        password: TEST_PASSWORD,
+        displayNameEn: "Rate Reg",
+      }),
+    });
+    // Either 201 (created) or 403 (registration closed) is fine — we only
+    // care that the route ran and consumed a slot, not 429.
+    assert.notEqual(r.status, 429, `attempt ${i + 1} unexpectedly throttled`);
+  }
+  const blocked = await fetch(`${API_BASE}/api/auth/register`, {
+    method: "POST",
+    headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json", "X-Forwarded-For": ip },
+    body: JSON.stringify({
+      username: `rl_reg_${STAMP}_final`,
+      email: `rl_reg_${STAMP}_final@example.com`,
+      password: TEST_PASSWORD,
+      displayNameEn: "Rate Reg",
+    }),
+  });
+  assert.equal(blocked.status, 429);
+});
+
+test("reset-password (and verify) share a per-IP limit returning 429 after the budget", async () => {
+  const ip = uniqueIp("reset");
+  // Default reset budget is 10 per 15 min per IP. Mix verify + reset hits to
+  // confirm both endpoints draw from the same per-IP bucket.
+  for (let i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
+    const path = i % 2 === 0 ? "/api/auth/reset-password/verify" : "/api/auth/reset-password";
+    const body =
+      i % 2 === 0
+        ? { token: `dummy_${i}` }
+        : { token: `dummy_${i}`, newPassword: TEST_PASSWORD };
+    const r = await fetch(`${API_BASE}${path}`, {
+      method: "POST",
+      headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json", "X-Forwarded-For": ip },
+      body: JSON.stringify(body),
+    });
+    // Verify returns 200 with valid:false; reset returns 400 invalid token.
+    assert.notEqual(r.status, 429, `attempt ${i + 1} on ${path} unexpectedly throttled`);
+  }
+  const blocked = await fetch(`${API_BASE}/api/auth/reset-password`, {
+    method: "POST",
+    headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json", "X-Forwarded-For": ip },
+    body: JSON.stringify({ token: "dummy_final", newPassword: TEST_PASSWORD }),
+  });
+  assert.equal(blocked.status, 429);
+});
+
+test("loopback (no X-Forwarded-For) is exempt in non-production so existing tests don't trip", async () => {
+  // We've just exhausted several limiters from synthetic IPs above. From
+  // loopback (the default for direct localhost requests), more attempts
+  // should still be processed normally — proving the dev-mode skip works.
+  const username = `rl_loop_${STAMP}`;
+  await createUser(username);
+
+  // Hammer loopback well past every per-IP budget (10/min login).
+  for (let i = 0; i < 15; i++) {
+    const r = await fetch(`${API_BASE}/api/auth/login`, {
+      method: "POST",
+      headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
+      body: JSON.stringify({ username: `__nope_${STAMP}_${i}`, password: "x" }),
+    });
+    // Either 401 (no such user) or 400 (validation) — never 429.
+    assert.notEqual(r.status, 429, `loopback attempt ${i + 1} unexpectedly throttled`);
+  }
+});

pnpm-lock.yaml

@@ -117,6 +117,9 @@ importers:
       express:
         specifier: ^5
         version: 5.2.1
+      express-rate-limit:
+        specifier: ^8.5.1
+        version: 8.5.1(express@5.2.1)
       express-session:
         specifier: ^1.19.0
         version: 1.19.0
@@ -3409,6 +3412,12 @@ packages:
   exifr@7.1.3:
     resolution: {integrity: sha512-g/aje2noHivrRSLbAUtBPWFbxKdKhgj/xr1vATDdUXPOFYJlQ62Ft0oy+72V6XLIpDJfHs6gXLbBLAolqOXYRw==}
 
+  express-rate-limit@8.5.1:
+    resolution: {integrity: sha512-5O6KYmyJEpuPJV5hNTXKbAHWRqrzyu+OI3vUnSd2kXFubIVpG7ezpgxQy76Zo5GQZtrQBg86hF+CM/NX+cioiQ==}
+    engines: {node: '>= 16'}
+    peerDependencies:
+      express: '>= 4.11'
+
   express-session@1.19.0:
     resolution: {integrity: sha512-0csaMkGq+vaiZTmSMMGkfdCOabYv192VbytFypcvI0MANrp+4i/7yEkJ0sbAEhycQjntaKGzYfjfXQyVb7BHMA==}
     engines: {node: '>= 0.8.0'}
@@ -3680,6 +3689,10 @@ packages:
     resolution: {integrity: sha512-5Hh7Y1wQbvY5ooGgPbDaL5iYLAPzMTUrjMulskHLH6wnv/A+1q5rgEaiuqEjB+oxGXIVZs1FF+R/KPN3ZSQYYg==}
     engines: {node: '>=12'}
 
+  ip-address@10.2.0:
+    resolution: {integrity: sha512-/+S6j4E9AHvW9SWMSEY9Xfy66O5PWvVEJ08O0y5JGyEKQpojb0K0GKpz/v5HJ/G0vi3D2sjGK78119oXZeE0qA==}
+    engines: {node: '>= 12'}
+
   ipaddr.js@1.9.1:
     resolution: {integrity: sha512-0KI/607xoxSToH7GjN1FfSbLoU0+btTicjsQSWQlh/hZykN8KpmMf7uYwPW3R+akZ6R/w18ZlXSHBYXiYUPO3g==}
     engines: {node: '>= 0.10'}
@@ -7464,6 +7477,11 @@ snapshots:
 
   exifr@7.1.3: {}
 
+  express-rate-limit@8.5.1(express@5.2.1):
+    dependencies:
+      express: 5.2.1
+      ip-address: 10.2.0
+
   express-session@1.19.0:
     dependencies:
       cookie: 0.7.2
@@ -7829,6 +7847,8 @@ snapshots:
 
   internmap@2.0.3: {}
 
+  ip-address@10.2.0: {}
+
   ipaddr.js@1.9.1: {}
 
   is-extglob@2.1.1: {}